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Definitions 
 
 We propose interactive verification protocol (VP) that utilizes the concept of verification set 
of participants. Verification set of participants (VSoP) is the set of the secret participants that 
are needed to verify their shares. In order to test validity of the shares, all shares belonging to 
the participants from the VSoP are required.  
Verification structure (VS) is the superset containing all verification sets of shares. Both terms 
(VSoP, VS) are closely related to authorized set of participant and general access structure , 
respectively. Moreover, we consider verification sets of participants that are subsets of 
authorized sets of participants.  
 For instance, consider ( )n,t  threshold secret sharing schemes. Our proposal allows to create 
( )ntv ,,  sharing scheme, where v  denotes number of participants in verification sets. 
  When participants belonging to the authorized set want to recover the secret, they first run 
VP for all VSoP-es contained in that set. In the example from above, VP is run for 





v
t
 sets. 
 
Notation 
 
1.  Take any secret sharing scheme (SSS) over general access structure, with the k  
participants 1P , 2P ,…, kP  and corresponding secret shares 1s , 2s ,…, ks . Let’s denote 0C  as 
the combiner algorithm for that secret sharing scheme.  
2. In order to implement VSS  each secret share is  should be extended by the control part ic  
to form extended secret share is'  . 
 
 
 
 
is  and ic                           is ic                                       is'  
 
 
3. Let ( )αaaC ,...,11 , ( )βbbC ,...,12  denote the combiner algorithms for two secret shares 
schemes operating on the sets of the shares αaa ,...,1  and βbb ,...,1 , respectively. 
 
 
 
 
is  with appended ic  
Operations in verification set of participants (VSoP) 
 
1. Let 
1
'is ,…, nis'  be extended secret shares, such that each share belongs to some 
participant 
αiP ( },...,1{ n=α , kn ≤ ) and set { }nii PP ,...,1  forms VSoP. 
 
1
'is ,…, nis'  
 
1is ,…, nis         1ic ,…, nic  
 
2. Combine 
1is ,…, nis using 1C  to get sR  (resulting secret part). Formally ( ) sii RssC n =,...,11 . 
3. Combine 
1ic ,…, nic  using 2C  to get  cR  (resulting control part). Formally ( ) cii RccC n =,...,12  
 
 
 
 
 
sR                  cR  
 
4. R  is total result equal cs RR  ( cR  appended to sR ) and set { }nii PP ,...,1  forms VSoP. 
 
 
 
 
R  
 
Observation 1: when 
1
'is ,…, nis'  are valid, then ( ) cs RRf =  for  every is' in the VSoP.  
Observation 2:  different 1C , 2C  and )(xf  can be used for each VSoP. 
 
 
Construction of control function )(xf  
 
Description:  
)(xf takes l -bit vector x  and computes m -bit image/control number, where lm < . 
Requirement: 
)(xf  should be efficient to compute. 
Sample candidates for )(xf : 
a. for 1=m  use balanced, nonlinear Boolean function (e.g., modified bent function) 
b. for 1>m , one can use a vector of m  balanced, nonlinear Boolean functions. 
Consecutive values of functions from the vector are written as binary sequence to form 
m -bit control number. 
c. check-digit schemes, for instance one based on 5D  symmetry group. 
d. hash functions 
apply  
 ( )
nii
ssC ,...,
11
 
apply   ( )
nii
ccC ,...,
12
 
Verification Protocol (VP) 
 
Verification protocol (one round). The participants can verify their shares without co-
operation of a third party.  
1.  For any verification set of shares (VSoP)  compute R  equal cs RR  . 
2. Compute ( )sRf . 
3. Test relation between ( )sRf  and cR :  
if ( ) cs RRf ≠  at least one of the shares in VSoP is invalid (verification is negative/ negative 
verification result) 
if ( ) cs RRf =  all shares in VSoP  are valid with some probability ( )nii ssP ',...,' 1 .      ■ 
 
 Described above protocol is performed for all VSoP contained in the authorized set of 
participants, that want to recover the secret. 
 
On probability ( )
nii ssP ',...,' 1  
 
Let 1C  , 2C   be combiner algorithms for perfect secret sharing schemes. In addition  
the impact on R  resulting from any change of bit(s)  in  
1
'is ,…, nis'  cannot predicted in at 
least one of  1C  , 2C .  ( )
nii ssP ',...,' 1  depends on the cR  length ( m -bits) , we think that for properly chosen )(xf ,   
it is related to the probability of  guessing m -bits number.  For the given m  there are 
m

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m -bits numbers, hence ( ) mii nssP 





−=
2
11',...,'
1
 for properly chosen )(xf .   
 
Illustrative example: ( )ntv ,,  secret sharing scheme 
 
We assume that )(xf  is balanced, nonlinear Boolean function with ( )
2
1
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Take ( )4,3  threshold secret sharing where secret was shared using Shamir method ( 0C  is 
Shamir combiner algorithm).  
Participants 1P , 2P , 3P , 4P  hold secret shares 1's , 2's , 3's , 4's  respectively. 
Authorized sets of participants: { }321 P,P,P ,{ }421 P,P,P ,{ }431 P,P,P , { }432 P,P,P  
Verification sets of participants: { }21 P,P , { }31 P,P , { }41 P,P , { }32 P,P , { }42 P,P , { }43 P, P  
Let ( ) 2357 xxxg ++=  be random polynomial  over )31(GF .  
ixi = for 4,3,2,1=i    { }4,3,2,1∈i  
( ) 21 01111151 === gs , 11 =c  resulting in 011111'1 =s   
( ) 22 11101292 === gs , 02 =c  resulting in 111010'2 =s  
( ) 23 10010183 === gs , 13 =c  resulting in 100101'3 =s  
( ) 24 01101134 === gs , 14 =c  resulting in 011011'4 =s  
 
Let both of 1C , 2C  be combiner algorithm for KGH secret shares scheme. 
 
Now consider authorized set { }321 P,P,P  
Such authorized set has the following verification sets:  { }21 P,P , { }31 P,P , { }32 P,P . 
 For: 
 { }21 P,P  1001021 =⊕= ssRs and  121 =⊕= ccRc , 
 { }31 P,P   1110131 =⊕= ssRs  and  031 =⊕= ccRc ,   
 { }32 P,P  0111132 =⊕= ssRs  and  132 =⊕= ccRc    
 
Verification protocol  
1st round for { }21 P,P  ( ) ( ) cR110010 === fRf s , hence 21 s',s'  are valid with ( ) 2
1
s',s' 21 =P  
2nd round for { }31 P,P  ( ) ( ) cR011101 === fRf s , hence 31 s',s'  are valid with ( ) 2
1
s',s' 31 =P  
3rd round for { }32 P,P  ( ) ( ) cR101111 === fRf s , hence 32 s',s'  are valid with ( ) 2
1
s',s' 32 =P  
■ 
Discussion of VP results: 
1. No negative verification result was obtained in all rounds of VP. 
2. Each of is'  is valid with probability 75,02
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Conclusions 
 
Presented VSS has the following features: 
- works for any secret sharing scheme, 
- does not require cooperation of the trusted third party, 
- can be implemented for general access structure,  
- its efficiency is not related to the number of dishonest participants, 
- does not weaken security parameter of underlying secret sharing scheme. 
The last requirement means that no extra information about the secret is revealed.  
For example perfect secret sharing scheme, when used with proposed VSS, still remains 
perfect. The information rate for the secret shares is always smaller than one, even for 
underlying ideal secret sharing schemes. In the particular design it can be made close to one. 
